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This study describes the Radiac Program and presents a
methodology for examining the productivity and cost effective-
ness of two repair facilities, one civilian-manned and the
other military-manned. A three-fiscal-year set of summary
work data (FY 1980, FY 1981, and FY 1982) was used in the
analysis.
The data analysis shows the civilian-manned repair facil-
ity to be almost twice as productive in output per manhour.
The study theorizes that the civilians' level of skill and
familiarity with radiacs accounts for their high productivity
as compared to the military.
The analysis also finds that civilians are almost three
times as efficient in output per constant labor dollar as
the military. This is the result of the 50% lower cost per
man-hour worked, in combination with their nearly doubled
productivity.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PROBLEM
In recent years, the public and private sectors have be-
come increasingly concerned with both efficiency and effec-
tiveness in operations. This concern becomes more significant
as operating costs increase and the supporting revenue base
remains constant or decreases. Management's major goals for
dealing with this situation are maximum effectiveness and
maximum efficiency.
Effectiveness is the degree to which an organization at-
tains its objectives. In non-profit organizations such as
the Department of Defense, effectiveness cannot be measured
in terms of financial data alone as there is no balance sheet
or bottom line. If reliable measures of the organization's
accomplishments can be found, a comparison of planned and
actual output provides a numerical measure of effectiveness
[Ref. l:p. 231].
Efficiency, on the other hand, is the ratio of outputs
to inputs, or the amount of output per unit of input. Effi-
ciency conveys the same meaning as productivity. Productiv-
ity has acquired many definitions over the years. For
instance, it is defined as "the change in product obtained
from resources expended" [Ref. 2: p. 3]. The General Account-
ing Office (GAO) takes a broader approach in defining
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productivity to include all measures of efficiency, i.e.,
output per manhour worked, output per manhour paid, and unit
cost [Ref. 3:p. 2].
The literature indicates that the Federal Government be-
gan a concerted effort to correlate productivity, productiv-
ity measures, and cost savings in the early 1970s. In 1970
GAO, in conjunction with the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
and the Office of Management and Budget (OBM), conducted a
study to determine if Federal productivity was measurable.
The study concluded that productivity of the workforce could
be measured, and that the resulting data could be useful in
manpower forecasting, manpower utilization, and budget
formulation [Ref. 3:p. 2],
In 1972 the Naval Personnel Research and Development
Laboratory published a model for measuring productivity
trends at naval shore activities [Ref. 4], This document
provided the Navy manager with a tool for measuring produc-
tivity at all military levels in the command. Though tai-
lored with the military in mind, the concepts could readily
be applied to the civilian workforce since maximum efficien-
cy is an objective the total workforce should strive to
achieve.
The results of the initial studies generated consider-
able interest on the behalf of the Federal Government in
productivity measurement. It became apparent to the Federal
Government that such data collected at regular intervals
could become a very important management tool. The collection
and subsequent analysis of these data could provide the na-
tion's leaders with current information on the workforce's
productivity. To ensure the availability of data, the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) has compiled and published a gener-
al indicator for the Federal Government and selected indus-
tires for many years. In addition to the efforts of the BLS,
the United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in
1980 directed the Workforce Effectiveness and Development
Group (WED), a subunit of OPM, to conduct ongoing research
on ways to improve and measure productivity [Ref. 5:p. 13].
It was this type of interest in cost-effectiveness and
productivity that led some of the officials within the Naval
Electronic Systems Command (NAVELEX) headquarters to look at
areas which were appropriate for a management study. One
such area which was considered and subsequently pursued was
the Radiac Repair Program. Over the last few years operat-
ing costs had been increasing and only some of the increase
was attributable to normal cost growth, (i.e., inflation).
It was thought that the unexplained growth could be the re-
sult of inattentiveness to cost-effectiveness practices or
reduced productivity.
It is with this problem of unexplained cost growth with-
in the Radiac Repair Program that this thesis is concerned.
Due to the extent of the program and the number of facili-
ties involved it was beyond the scope of this thesis to
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attempt a comprehensive analysis of the entire program. The
analysis is limited to the problem of comparing the relative
productivities of civilian vs. military repair personnel
within the Radiac Repair Program.
B. OBJECTIVE
This study will analyze and compare the effectiveness and
efficiency of operations of the Radiac Repair Facility,
Washington, DC and the Ship Repair Facility (Radiac Repair
section) Rota, Spain. As neither is a profit-making entity
the major thrust will be on the labor cost incurred for op-
erations, and the level of output produced based on the re-
sources applied. The objective of this study is to determine
if it is more cost-effective to man radiac repair facilities
with civilian personnel or military personnel, in terms of
actual labor dollar expenditures and productivity levels.
C. RESEARCH METHODS
1. Data
The Radiac Repair Facility ( RRF ) in Washington, DC
was chosen as a typical civilian-manned facility and was
used as the data sample for the analysis of such activities.
The Radiac Repair Facility in Rota, Spain--the only RRF
wholly manned by military personnel--was used as the data
sample for military-manned activities. The analysis was
conducted on quarterly summary data for fiscal years 1980
through 1982 from these two RRFs. The data analyzed in
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this study includes the number of personnel at each RRF, the
quarterly output of radiac units calibrated, and the number
of manyears of effort and labor cost it took to calibrate
the radiacs.
2 . Data Sources
Commander, Naval Electronic Systems Command (NAVELEX
8753) supplied the radiac maintenance workload quarterly re-
ports for the Rota and Washington facilities. A sample of
these quarterly reports is included as Appendix B. Relevant
data extracted from the quarterly reports of the two facili-
ties for the sample period FY 80-FY 82 is summarized in Ap-
pendix C. Several interviews were conducted with personnel
in the Radiac Program to obtain pertinent background infor-
mation and an outlook for the future.
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION
Chapter II describes the Radiac Program and provides
background information on the operation of Radiac Repair
Facilities.
Chapter III analyzes the productivity of workers at the
two facilities. It discusses the differences found in the
level of productivity for the two workforces and presents
some possible explanations for the differences.
Chapter IV analyzes the cost data of the two facilities
in both current dollars and constant dollars. The cost per




Chapter V presents a summary of the conclusions of this
study and recommendations for future research.
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A radiac is an apparatus for detecting and measuring
nuclear radiation. The acronym "RADIAC" stands for RAdio-
active, Detection, Identification, And Computation. The
Radiac Program is concerned with all matters dealing with
radioactive detection and measurement. The primary consid-
erations of the Radiac Program are safety, emergency pre-
paredness, and adherence to pertinent government regulations.
A. THE RADIAC PROGRAM
The United States Navy's Radiac Program is sponsored by
the Commander, Naval Electronic Systems Command Headquarters
(NAVELEX). It is under the guidance of this major naval
command that the program is managed and equipment procured.
NAVELEX has the responsibility for radiac equipment "from
the cradle to the grave" which includes allowance administra-
tion, budgeting, procurement, maintenance, and calibration.
The administrative responsibilities of managing this func-
tional area are resident in the Nucleonic Branch of NAVELEX.
The Key responsibilities of maintenance, calibration, and
allowance actions (recommendations for approval of requests
for radiac equipment) are delegated to ten Radiac Coordina-
tors. These Coordinators are physically located at six
NAVELEX field activities, three naval shipyards and one
other naval activity. Each Radiac Coordinator is assigned
14
a geographical area or areas of responsibility for which
service must be provided. A listing of the locations of
Radiac Coordinators and their areas of responsibility is
presented in Appendix A.
The Navy operates nineteen repair facilities for the
maintenance and calibration of radiacs. Each facility is
designed to meet the specific requirements assigned to it.
That is to say, the size and capacity of the facility are
commensurate with the overall number of radiacs assigned
for servicing.
B. PERSONNEL
Seventeen of the nineteen repair facilities are entire-
ly manned by civilian government employees. One repair fa-
cility has a mixture of civilian and military manning. The
final facility is completely manned with military personnel
All personnel are either electronic technicians or electron-
ic mechanics. On the average, civilian employees have more
than ten years of experience in the repair facilities. Mil-
itary personnel have less work experience with radiacs be-
cause they are totated to and from duty stations in which
they perform maintenance and repair duties on other kinds
of equipment than radiacs.
C. FUNDING
The Radiac Program is fully funded by NAVELEX for rou-
tine maintenance, repair, and calibration services for
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NAVELEX-approved-allowance equipment used for operational
and disaster preparedness purposes. Civilian-manned repair
facilities receive Operation and Maintenance, Navy funds
(O&MN) to support operation costs. Funds from the O&MN ac-
count cover civilian labor cost, material costs, and any
commercial support contracts that exist. Military-manned
repair facilities receive O&MN money to pay for the above
types of expenses, but the major costs of the military labor
are paid from a different appropriation acocunt: Military
Personnel, Navy ( MPN ) . All costs for the civilian-manned
facilities are reported quarterly to NAVELEX on the "radiac
maintenance workload reports". In the case of the military-
manned repair facility, the only cost reported to NAVELEX
is material as all labor costs are charged to MPN.
D. EQUIPMENT
A substance is said to be radioactive when it gives off
or has the capacity for giving off, radiant energy in the
form of particles or rays, as alpha, beta, and gamma rays
by the disintegration of atomic nuclei [Ref. 6:p. 36].
Each of these types of radiation have different properties,
thus requiring different equipment for detection and accu-
rate measurement. NAVELEX issues a broad array of survey
meters, laboratory equipment, monitoring systems, dosime-
ters, calibrators, and other radiacs for detecting and
measuring ratiation in the work space and environment.
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E. MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND CALIBRATION
A policy for routine maintenance of all radiac equip-
ment has been established by NAVELEX. It prescribes stan-
dards for the minimum maintenance necessary to keep the
equipment in satisfactory operating condition. To insure
that all equipment is kept at operational readiness, the
Radiac Coordinator must develop maintenance schedules and
inform all user activities under his cognizance as to when
their equipment must be serviced. NAVELEXINST 9673. 5D
states that portable radiac equipment should be calibrated
at six month intervals, however, the instruction also de-
lineates several exceptions to the six month interval.
Those equipments listed as exceptions have calibration in-
tervals of one to two years or as directed by NAVELIX [Ref.
7: p. 15]. Since it is not operationally sound to remove
all of an activity's equipment at once, NAVELEX recommends
that one half of the allowance be turned over to the repair
facility every three months [Ref. 8:p. 27]. This also
helps give a more even distribution of the workload at the
facility throughout the workyear. Workload distribution
is a major concern of the Radiac Coordinator, who has the
responsibility of meeting all regularly scheduled require-
ments as well as providing emergency repair and calibration
service upon request [Ref. 8:p. 28].
The normal procedure for maintenance and calibration of
a radiac consists of several steps. Upon receipt of a
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radiac the outer case is wipe-tested for radiation contami-
nation before the radiac is brought to the work area. The
radiac is checked for electronic and mechanical deficiencies;
if any are found, the unit is repaired. Various checks are
made to see if the radiac is within acceptable tolerance
limits for accuracy. If it is found to be out of tolerance
it is recalibrated. Batteries are tested and replaced when
necessary. Once the radiac is repaired and calibrated, it
is ready for return to the user activity.
F. ALLOWANCE
Radiac equipment is obtained by the end-user (Customer)
through the establishment of an allowance. There are two
basic equipment allowances in the radiac program: operation-
al use (OU) and disaster preparedness (DP). An operational
use radiac is one used in day-to-day radiological working
and training. The disaster preparedness radiacs are those
designated for emergencies. Requests for OU allowances
originate with the requesting activities and are sent via
the Radiac Coordinator to NAVELEX. The Radiac Coordinator
endorses such requests and comments on the technical re-
quirements of the requested equipment. A request must in-
clude the equipment category, equipment nomenclature,
present allowance, and a complete justification of the
need. Approval of an OU allowance is based on the assigned
responsibilities of the requestor: radiography, weapons
handling, or industrial hygiene [Ref. 8:p. 16].
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Once an OU allowance is approved, NAVELEX issues radiac
equipment to the requestor. After receiving the equipment,
the end-user is required to provide the Radiac Coordinator
with an updated listing of equipment held. This listing is
used for scheduling maintenance and calibration.
In the case of the disaster preparedness allowance, the
request originates with the Disaster Preparedness Force
Commander, who also must send the request through the Radiac
Coordinator. The Radiac Coordinator completes the "Shore
Radiac Equipment Allowance" form indicating the number of
disaster preparedness teams and equipment desired. This
form is forwarded to Naval Electronic Systems Engineering
Center, Charleston (NESEC Charleston) for action. NESEC
Charleston determines the number of radiacs to be autho-
rized. The disaster preparedness request is then approved
and filled in accordance with priorities established by the
Chief of Naval Operations [Ref. 8:p. 20]. The remaining
procedures for accountability and maintenance scheduling
are the same as those of the operational use equipment.
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III. PRODUCTIVITY
This chapter deals with the impact of labor productivity
on output. The collected data will be analyzed to see if
there is a significant difference between the productivity
for the civilian-manned RRF (Washington) and the military-
manned RRF (Rota).
The analysis will be based on the principles of the
production function. A production function is a model
which shows the relation between inputs and outputs. It
takes the form of
Q = f(K,L)
where Q represents the output of a particular good during
a period, K represents the capital used during the period,
and L represents hours of labor input [Ref. 9:p. 133],
For this study capital is assumed to be constant for
all observations, both over time and between the two fa-
cilities. Labor is that input provided by the employees
of the facilities. It is assumed that only the labor in-
put is variable over the observations. The measurable out-
put, Q, is the number of radiacs calibrated. The output
and input elements will be considered individually later in
this chapter.
Before analyzing labor productivity for each of the fa-
cilities, it is necessary to establish a definition of labor
20
productivity. Economists define labor productivity as
"measures of output obtained from inputs of labor." [Ref. 9
p. 133] So in essence, this chapter is concerned with de-
termining how output varies compared to the available labor
input.
A. UNITS OF OUTPUT
For the purposes of this analysis, the units of output
in a RRF are calibrated radiacs. NAVELEX specifies that
the various equipments be converted to "standard calibra-
tion units" as follows [Ref. 10]:
1. Ratemeter and detector calibrations equal one
calibration unit.
2. Five dosimeter charger calibrations equal one
calibration unit.
3. Fifty dosimeter calibrations equal one calibration
unit.
Each RRF uses these predetermined standards to compute
total calibration units. These calibration units are then
summed for all the equipment serviced to arrive at the
quarterly output data that is reported by the RRFs to
NAVELEX.
Output in standard calibration units for the twelve
quarters in FY80-FY82 appears in Table 3-1 for the
Washington and Rota RRFs. This data is also presented




OUTPUT FOR FY 80-82
(STANDARD CALIBRATION UNITS)
Quarter RRF Washington RRF Rota
1 Oct-Dec 1979 400 122.36
2 Jan-Mar 1980 437 113
3 Apr-Jun 1980 428.5 201
4 Jul-Sep 1980 376 171
5 Oct-Dec 1980 283.5 168
6 Jan-Mar 1981 504 93.6
7 Apr-Jun 1981 501 173
8 Jul-Sep 1981 400 153
9 Oct-Dec 1981 364 152.5
10 Jan-Mar 1982 387 122.7
11 Apr-Jun 1982 592 200
12 Jul-Sep 1982 470 171.2
Mean 428.6 153.5
Source: Radiac Maintenance Workload Reports
B. UNITS OF INPUT
The input variable which this study examines in detail
is direct labor, in units of man-hours of effort provided
by the available personnel. The RRF Washington had a con-
stant four employees during the period of FY80-FY82 while
the RRF Rota had an average of 2.42 employees for the same
time period.
The Washington facility had located on its premises the
area Radiac Coordinator who was not counted as part of the
facility manning for the purpose of this study. During the
first four quarters (FY 1980) of the sample, there were
five employees assigned to the Washington facility, one of
whom was the Radiac Coordinator. Cost for the Coordinator
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Figure 3-1 Output per Facility
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The Coordinator retired the second week of the fifth quarter
of the sample period. One of the RRF line technicians sub-
sequently assumed the duties of Coordinator but also contin-
ued working as a line technician. Thus the RRF manning was
considered by this analysis as constant at four employees
throughout the period covered in this study.
The Rota facility had two technicians assigned for the
first seven quarters of the sample period. One technician
was added in the eighth quarter. Rota remained staffed with
three technicians for quarters nine through twelve. There
were changes in the grades of personnel assigned to Rota,
however, this information was considered only in deriving
cost which is discussed later. For the purpose of this chap-
ter only the quantity of labor input in man-years or man-
hours is analyzed. The possible qualitative effects of
paygrade, seniority, or experience on productivity were not
analyzed.
The input data used in this study came from the Radiac
Maintenance Workload Reports (Appendix B) and NAVELEX inter-
nal summary sheets [Ref. 11]. The Radiac Maintenance Work-
load Reports submitted by RRF Washington report the actual
effort in man-years utilized each quarter to produce the
output. These data reflect actual, recorded man-hours of
labor, converted to man-years before reporting by a conver-
sion factor of 2080 man-hours per man-year [Ref. 12].
24
The RRF Rota did not report man-year data on the Radiac
Maintenance Workload Reports as it did not have to account
to NAVELEX for labor cost. However, to maintain consistency
in record keeping and to aid in tracking trends for each of
the facilities, NAVELEX assigned man-year statistics to this
facility based on the actual onboard count of personnel.
NAVELEX assumed that one-fourth of a man-year was worked each
quarter per person as noted on the internal summary sheets.
So, if there were two persons manning the RRF in a given
quarter, the effort for that quarter was recorded by NAVELEX
as .50 man-year. Thus, man-year data for military labor at
the Rota RRF was strictly an estimate generated at NAVELEX
headquarters.
Clearly the methods employed for determining and report-
ing man-year data for the two facilities presented a problem
in conducting a comparison of the productivity of the two
facilities. Since the resulting data was not strictly com-
parable, it was necessary to develop conversion factors to
bring the repair facilities' data more in line with each
other.
In order to alleviate the dissimilarities in the report-
ed data, the "Manual of the Navy Total Force Manpower Poli-
cies and Procedures," OPNAVINST 1000. 16E, were used. This
was chosen as a definitive source because it contains infor-
mation on the number of hours which the Navy recognizes as
making up a standard workweek for both shore based civilian
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and military personnel. From this model for a standard
workweek, the information could be expanded to arrive at a
conversion factor between man-years and man-hours.
A standard workweek for shore-based civilian and military
personnel is taken to be five eight-hour days. This forty
hour workweek gives a 2080 hour man-year (52 weeks x 40 hours)
This figure of 2080 hours is the conversion factor for a
standard man-year [Ref. 13].
However, this factor actually represents the number of
work-hours available for labor by one worker in a year with-
out overtime. Obviously, some time can not be spend in pro-
duction. In order to estimate the number of man-hours of
production time in a year, average times can be subtracted
from the forty-hour base for training, diverison, leave, and
holidays. This was done in the OPNAV model, which gave es-
timates for an average productive week of 33.38 man-hours
for civilian personnel and 31.94 man-hours for military
personnel [Ref. 13].
The details of the OPNAV model are shown in Table 3-2.
Assuming a 52 week work-year this model yields an estimate
of 1736 productive man-hours and 344 non-productive man-
hours for civilian personnel. This information will be used
later in Chapter III in the productivity comparison between
the civilians and military.
The model yields 1661 productive man-hours per year for





















Total Time Available for
Productive Work 33.38 31.94
Source: OPNAVINST 1000. 16E
^Diversion is defined as military requirements which are
placed upon military personnel as a result of military rou-
tine or regulations and includes quarters, inspections,
sick call, payline, haircuts, business at the post office,
ship's store, and business at personnel and disbursing.
Diversion for civilians covers similar administrative
functions.
standard 2080 hours man-year are used for non-productive
activities. One must bear in mind that this can be an in-
accurate estimate because the military workweek may exceed
the standard forty-hours. This model was used to estimate
the input man-hours of labor for the military-manned
facility.
The initial step in preparing the data for a comparison
analysis was the conversion of the reported man-year data
to man-hours. This information is reflected in Tables 3-3
and 3-4. In these tables are shown by quarters, the number
of technicans, reported and/or estimated man-years, and
standardized or adjusted estimates of man-hours of labor
performed. The man-year data was that recorded by the
27
TABLE 3-3











































MEANS .73 1508 1736
SOURCE: RADIAC MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD REPORTS AND OPNAVINST
1000. 16E
LEGEND: TECHNICANS (NUMBER ASSIGNED PER QUARTER)
REPORTED MY (REPORTED MAN-YEARS)
STANDARDIZED MH (STANDARDIZED MAN-HOURS BASED ON
2080 ANNUAL MAN-HOURS/ REPORTED MAN-YEAR)
ADJUSTED MH (ADJUSTED MAN-HOURS BASED ON 1736
ANNUAL MAN-HOURS/AVAILABLE MAN- YEAR)
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TABLE 3-4
CONVERSION OF ESTIMATED MILITARY MAN-YEAR
DATA TO MAN-HOURS
(RRF ROTA)
QTR TECHNICIANS ESTIMATED MAN-YEARS ADJUSTED MAN-HOURS
1 2 .50 831
2 2 .50 831
3 2 .50 831
4 2 .50 831
5 2 .50 831
6 2 .50 831
7 2 .50 831
8 3 .75 1246
9 3 .75 1246
10 3 .75 1246
11 3 .75 1246
12 3 .75 1246
MEANS 2.42 .60 1004
SOURCE: RADIAC MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD REPORTS AND NAVELEX
INTERNAL WORKSHEETS
LEGEND: ADJUSTED MAN-HOURS (BASED ON 1661 ANNUAL MAN-HOURS/
ESTIMATED MAN-YEAR)
repair facility (for civilians) or estimated by NAVELEX (for
military). Standardized man-hours were those man-hours es-
timated from the man-year data using the conversion factor
of the standard 2080 man-hours per man-year. Adjusted man-
hours reflect the standard 2080 man-hours available adjusted
(as in the OPNAV model) for non-productive time. The con-
version factor for military technicians was 1661 man-hours
per man-year; for civilian technicians it was 1736 man-hours
per man-year.
The reported civilian man-year data as it appeared on the
Radiac Maintenance Workload Reports already reflected time
off for leave, holidays, and other diversion time. This
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indicated the most appropriate factor for conversion should
be the standard man-year of 2080 man-hours. The product of
the man-year data recorded on the Radiac Maintenance Work-
load Reports and the man-hours per standard man-year conver-
sion factor should give the most accurate estimate available
of actual labor input for the civilian force. However, data
similar to this was not available for the military. In order
to have comparable data for each facility a second estimate
of civilian labor input was made, although it was recognized
this could be less accurate than the "standard" estimate.
An adjusted man-hours estimate was made for the civilian fa-
cility by multiplying the available man-years (0.25 man-years
per quarter per civilian technician assigned) by the OPNAV
conversion factor of 1736 man-hours per year.
The military data available had not been adjusted in any
way. It simple reflected man-years of labor available (0.25
man-years per quarter per technician assigned). The best
estimate of labor input that could be made with this data
was the adjusted man-hours estimate made by multiplying the
labor available by the OPNAV adjusted conversion factor of
1661 man-hours per man-year.
C. PRODUCTIVITY ESTIMATES
The standardizations of output and labor in the previous
two sections served as the framework for determining the
productivity estimates discussed in this section.
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Productivity was estimated by dividing the standardized
quarterly output as described in Section A by the estimated
direct labor input for that quarter using the data and model
described in Section B. The formula used to compute output
per man-hour was:
Productivity = Standardized Output (Calibrations)
Estimated Labor Input (Man-Hours)
The results obtained from this computation are the productiv-
ity data which were obtained by dividing the output, in
"standardized calibration units," by either the standardized
or the adjusted labor inputs (converted to man-hours by one
of the factors described earlier).
Table 3-5 contains information about the Washington fa-
cility. Included are the quarterly unit output and the
standardized man-hours input, along with the resultant
productivity.
TABLE 3-5
CIVILIAN OUTPUT PER STANDARDIZED MAN-HOUR
STANDARDIZED
QTR OUTPUT MAN-HOURS PRODUCTIVITY
1 400 1539 .26
2 437 1560 .28
3 428.5 1539 .27
4 376 1290 .29
5 283.5 2038 .14
6 504 1997 .25
7 5(D1 1414 .35
8 400 1394 .29
9 364 1310 .28
10 387 1310 .30
11 592 1435 .41
12 470 1269 .37
MEANS 428.6 1508 .29
LEGEND: QTR (QUARTERS AS DEFINED IN TABLE 3-1)
OUTPUT (STANDARD CALIBRATION UNITS FROM TABLE 3-1
STANDARDIZED MAN-HOURS (FROM TABLE 3-3)
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Table 3-6 contains data similar to that of Table 3-5.
The difference is the basis for the estimated labor man-hours.
In the preceeding table, civilian labor input was estimated
using the standard man-year of 2080 man-hours. In Table 3-6,
civilian labor input estimates were based on the adjusted
man-hour model described in the preceeding sections.
TABLE 3-6
CIVILIAN OUTPUT PER ADJUSTED MAN-HOUR
ADJUSTED
QTR OUTPUT MAN-HOURS PRODUCTIVITY
1 400 1736 .23
2 437 1736 .25
3 428.5 1736 .25
4 376 1736 .22
5 283.5 1736 .16
6 504 1736 .29
7 501 1736 .29
8 400 1736 .23
9 364 1736 .21
10 387 1736 .22
11 592 1736 .34
12 470 1736 .27
MEANS 428.6 1736 .25
LEGEND: QTR (QUARTERS AS DEFINED IN TABLE 3-1)
OUTPUT (STANDARD CALIBRATION UNITS FROM TABLE 3-1)
ADJUSTED MAN-HOURS (FROM TABLE 3-3)
Table 3-7 shows corresponding information for the Rota
facility. As noted earlier, actual military productive la-
bor was not recorded; only adjusted man-hour estimates based
on total labor available for productive work can be made for
the Rota facility. Table 3-7 reflects this data.
The productivity estimates from Tables 3-5, 3-6 and 3-7
are displayed graphically in Figure 3-2.
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TABLE 3-7
MILITARY OUTPUT PER ADJUSTED MAN-HOUR
ADJUSTED
QTR OUTPUT MAN-HOURS PRODUCTIVITY
1 122.3 831 .15
2 113 831 .14
3 201 831 .24
4 171 831 .21
5 168 831 .20
6 93.6 831 .11
7 173 831 .21
8 153 1246 .12
9 152.5 1246 .12
10 122.7 1246 .10
11 200 1246 .16
12 171.2 1246 .14
MEANS 153.5 1004 .16
LEGEND: QTR (QUARTERS, AS DEFINED IN TABLE 3-1)
OUTPUT (STANDARD CALIBRATION UNITS FROM TABLE 3-1
ADJUSTED MAN-HOURS (FROM TABLE 3-4)
It is clear from Figure 3-2 that civilian productivity,
by either standardized or adjusted estimate, was higher than
military productivity in 11 of the 12 quarters. Only in
quarter 5 of the sample (Oct-Dec 1980) did military produc-
tivity exceed that of the civilian workforce. (It was in
this quarter that the civilian-manned RRF Washington re-
corded both its lowest output of units calibrated and its
highest input of reported labor. The reasons for this
atypical activity at RRF Washington were not recorded on the
Radiac Maintenance Workload Report. ) In fact, except for
quarters three through five (Apr-Dec 1980), civilian pro-
ductivity by either estimate was very substantially greater
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Figure 3-2 Average Productivity
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entire 12 quarters of the sample, civilian productivity was
estimated at either .29 units/man-hour (standardized) or .25
units/man-hour (adjusted). The adjusted estimate of military
productivity over the whole sample was .16 units/man-hour.
It is conclusive from the above that the civilian force
had higher productivity than did the military labor force.
The general factors that may have had an influence on this
difference are discussed in the next sections.
D. THE WORKFORCE
In Section C approximately a two-fold difference in the
productivity level was observed between the civilian and
military workforces. This seemed to be quite a disportionate
difference because each workforce was staffed with trained
electronic technicians. One of the most likely explanations
for this variance rests in the relative skill and familiar-
ity with the equipment: the familiar "learning curve"
phenomenon.
The civilian personnel at the Washington facility had
worked an average of fifteen years in the Radiac Program.
In contrast, though they had a good general background and
experience in electronics and electronic equipment, the
military personnel generally only had performed duties at a
radiac repair facility for two to three years. Unlike the
civilian personnel, the military were subj ected to periodic
duty station rotations; therefore, much of their expertise
was in repairing and maintaining other types of electronic
equipment than radiacs.
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It would be expected that upon a military technician
initially being assigned to an RRF, productivity would be
lower until the sailor became familiar with the work. The
data analyzed did not indicate which stage of their tours
that military personnel were in when the data were collected,
although all the military clearly had much less RRF experi-
ence than the civilian average of fifteen years.
This wide diversity in level of experience between the
two labor forces suggests that the principles of specializa-
tion of labor and the learning curve may have been factors
that had a significant influence on the observed
productivities.
It is also the case that "productive work" for military
members is often interpreted by their commands to be any
military duty, a matter not addressed by the OPNAV model
[Ref. 13]. Thus, while a civilian technician is rarely
tasked to anything other than the productive work for which
he is hired, with associated setup and cleanup (and the
"diversion" activities addressed by the OPNAV model), a
military member may (aside from "diversion") be assigned to
watch, shore patrol, mess cook, security, etc., duties over
an extended period in place of his nominal "productive"
duties. This also may have had a significant impact.
E. WORKLOAD
No detailed data on the facilities' workloads were
available from the collected data. The available workloading
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data were reported as quarterly summaries only with no indi-
cation as to the average daily or weekly throughput, nor of
the levels of inventory of work accepted but not begun.
The Washington facility primarily serviced shore activi-
ties in the Naval District Washington area. Possessing gen-
eral information as to the allowance of each activity, the
repair facility could schedule the induction of radiacs to
maximize the use of its available manning. Inventory could
be stockpiled to ensure that there was a steady flow of work,
Having scheduling flexibility provides the opportunity for
more efficiency in operation.
Compared to Rota RRF, the more routine nature of the
work, predictability of demand and possibility of inventory-
ing work accepted gave the Washington facility much more of
an opportunity to process similar types of radiacs in
batches according to economic lot sizes.
The Rota repair facility's primary customers were ships
and aircraft squadrons, most of which were only in Rota for
brief periods. Even though the facility may be privy to the
number and types of radiacs a particular ship class is au-
thorized to have onboard, it would have no further detail
available for advanced planning. The tendency of ships to
operate together in Task Units would work against being able
to even out the workload. Because of the immediacy imposed
by ship movements, it would be quite difficult for Rota to
maintain even workload levels to ensure the most efficiency
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for the resources invested. Compared to Washington, it is
likely the Rota workloading was characterized by much more
severe peaks and valleys. Also, since Rota was dealing with
operating ships and aircraft, Rota's work was likely to have
been done more urgently, with less allowable processing time
than was Washington's. It is therefore unlikely that Rota
could have made significant use of economic lot size planning.
Finally, because of the relative urgency of the work, Rota
may have been staffed at a level determined more by the peaks
in loading than by considerations of overall operating
efficiency.
For these reasons, the Washington facility would have
more opportunity to maximize efficiency than the Rota
facility.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has presented a basic analysis of the pro-
ductivity levels of the civilian and military personnel. It
has revealed a nearly two-fold difference in productivity
for the two workforces. That is to say, the civilian per-
sonnel were almost twice as productive as the military
personnel
.
In the next chapter this productivity information will
be combined with labor cost data to address the relative
cost efficiency of the two facilities.
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IV. COSTS AND COST COMPARISONS
This chapter discusses the labor costs associated with
the operation of the repair facilities. The analysis looks
at how labor cost is derived for each workforce--civilian
and military. The labor cost is standardized and converted
to constant dollars. Finally, a unit cost comparison of the
two facilities is made.
A. DESCRIPTION
The cost data used in this study were obtained from two
sources. Civilian labor cost data were extracted directly
from the Radiac Maintenance Workload Reports. These data
were expressed in current dollars and included overhead cost
elements such as leave pay, holiday pay, retirement, and in-
surance. Since no labor cost data was reported for the mil-
itary, it was necessary to derive a cost. Military labor
cost, in current dollars, was determined from manning levels
reported by the facility through the use of the Life Cycle
Navy Enlisted Billet Costs model [Ref. 14]. This model in-
cludes base pay, the amortized selective reenlistment bonus
(SRB), proficiency pay, hazard pay, sea pay, variable hous-
ing allowance (VHA), retirement, separation pay, accession,
training, and undistributed costs over the life cycle of the
billet.
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B. CURRENT DOLLAR VS CONSTANT DOLLAR
The current dollar is "an expression reflecting actual
prices of each year", whereas the constant dollar is "an ex-
pression reflecting the actual prices of a previous year or
the average of actual prices of a previous period or years"
[Ref. 15:p. 685]. Economists use the constant dollar con-
cept to compensate for the effects of inflation. To calcu-
late costs in constant dollar amounts, an index is computed.
The index discloses relative changes in a series of numbers
such as labor cost from a base period. The base period is
assigned an index number of 1.00. All other index numbers
in the series, both before and after the base period, re-
flect the ratio of prices in that period to prices in the
base period [Ref. 15:p. 392],
Before proceeding with the computation of the labor cost
index, it was necessary to establish a base cost for the
civilian and military workforces to normalize cost for fur-
ther analyses. The civilian paygrades at the Washington fa-
cility during the period of this study were GS-11/5, GS-10/5,
GS-8/5, and GS-2/3. In order to arrive at an average pay-
grade representative of the workforce, the annual salaries
of the individuals were computed and the resulting average
was commensurate with that of a GS-8/1. The annual salary
of a GS-8/1 was used to construct the index of civilian pay
for this analysis.
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Unlike the paygrades of the Washington facility, which
remained constant, the workforce at the Rota facility varied
over the period of time covered in this study. Paygrades
from E-4 to E-9 were present at Rota. To determine the
average paygrade, the base pay for those paygrades onboard
were used. Since the data did not indicate longevity, the
minimum longevity for each paygrade was assumed. The aver-
age representative paygrade was determined to be an E-6
(over 6). The base pay for this paygrade was used to calcu-
late the index of military pay for this analysis.
The labor cost index was computed by dividing the select-
ed average paygrade salary in each quarter by the same aver-
age paygrade salary for the first quarter. Table 4-1 shows
the labor price indices for civilian and military.
In studying the data in this table, it is apparent that
from the first to the second fiscal year (quarters 1-4 to
quarters 5-8), there was a moderately large increase in the
labor cost index for both the civilian and military. There
was an even more marked upturn in the military labor cost
index in the third year (quarter 9-3). This is the result
of the FY 82 military payraise of over 11% compared to the
substantially smaller civilian pay raise.
The cost indices shown in Table 4-1 were used as the
denominator for the ratio:
Labor Cost (Constant Dollars) = Labor Cost in Current Dollars
Labor Cost Index
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This formula was used to compute the constant dollar values
of the cost of labor input.
TABLE 4-1
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LABOR COST INDEX
CIVILIAN MILITARY
QTR ANNUAL LABOR COST ANNUAL BASE LABOR C
SALARY INDEX PAY INDEX
(GS-8/1) (E -6 over 6)
1 $15423 1.00 $ 9432 1.00
2 $15423 1.00 $ 9432 1.00
3 $15423 1.00 $ 9432 1.00
4 $15423 1.00 $ 9432 1.00
5 $16826 1.09 $10536 1.12
6 $16826 1.09 $10536 1.12
7 $16826 1.09 $10536 1.12
8 $16826 1.09 $10536 1.12
9 $17634 1.14 $12276 1.30
10 $17634 1.14 $12276 1.30
11 $17634 1.14 $12276 1.30
12 $17634 1.14 $12276 1.30
SOURCE: CIVILIAN ANNUAL SALARY TAKEN FROM FEDERAL E
GENERAL SCHEDULE.
MILITARY ANNUAL BASE PAY TAKEN FROM MILITARY PAY
SCHEDULES.
The Washington facility reported labor cost based on the
Federal Employee General Schedule. For the purpose of this
analysis the labor cost data was extracted from the Radiac
Maintenance Workload Reports. Referring to Appendices B and
C, it can be seen that there are several areas of cost re-
ported. In this analysis, only the cost for repair and
calibration personnel was used. This information is re-
flected in Table 4-2. The decision was made to use cost for
repair and calibration personnel only which includes both
the direct labor cost and indirect labor cost.
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TABLE 4-2

















COST COST PER UNIT
CUR $ INDEX CON & OF OUTPUT
CUR $ CON $
$18649 1.00 $18649 $46.62 $46.62
$16007 1.00 $16007 $36.63 $36.63
$16925 1.00 $16925 $39.50 $39.50
$14102 1.00 $14102 $37.51 $37.51
$21618 1.09 $19833 $76.25 $69.95
$20493 1.09 $18801 $40.66 $37.30
$14776 1.09 $13556 $29.49 $27.06
$14171 1.09 $13000 $35.43 $32.50
$13313 1.14 $11678 $36.57 $32.08
$15460 1.14 $13561 $39.95 $35.04
$16838 1.14 $14770 $28.44 $24.95
$14115 1.14 $12382 $30.03 $26.34
$39.76 $37.13
RADIAC MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD REPORTS
QTR (QUARTER)
CUR $ (CURRENT DOLLAR, COST OF LABOR: ACTUAL GRADES)
CON $ (CONSTANT DOLLAR, COST OF LABOR: ACTUAL GRADES
Military labor cost in current dollars was determined by-
using the NEBC model. Cost was extracted from the cost ta-
bles for each paygrade reported onboard. The sum of these
costs for each individual resulted in the quarterly labor
cost in current dollar, as shown in Table 4-3.
The efficiency of the two repair facilities is shown in
the last columns of Tables 4-2 and 4-3. A plot of these
data is shown in Figure 4-1.
It appears from Tables 4-2 and 4-3 that the cost of di-
rect labor, in both current and constant dollars, was gen-
erally greater for the civilian facility due to the greater
number of civilian workers. However, the per person cost
43
TABLE 4-3
MILITARY LABOR COST DATA
COST COST PER UNIT
QTR OUTPUT CUR $ INDEX CON $ OF OUTPUT
CUR $ CON $
1 122.4 $12766 1.00 $12766 $104.30 $104.30
2 113 $12766 1.00 $12766 $112.97 $112.97
3 201 $12766 1.00 $12766 $ 63.51 $ 63.51
4 171 $12766 1.00 $12766 $ 74.65 $74.65
5 168 $13437 1.12 $11997 $ 79.98 $ 71.41
6 93.6 $13437 1.12 $11997 $143.56 $128.18
7 173 $14370 1.12 $12830 $ 83.06 $ 74.16
8 153 $20087 1.12 $17934 $131.29 $117.22
9 152.5 $24135 $1.30 $18565 $158.26 $121.74
10 122.7 $24135 $1.30 $18565 $196.70 $151.30
11 200 $26090 $1.30 $20069 $130.45 $100.34
12 171.2 $26090 $1.30 $20069 $152.39 $117.22
MEANS $119.26 $103.08
SOURCE: NAVY ENLISTED BILLET COST MODEL
LEGEND: QTR (QUARTERS)
CUR $ (CURRENT DOLLAR, COST OF LABOR: ACTUAL GRADES)
CON $ (CONSTANT DOLLAR, COST OF LABOR: ACTUAL GRADES)
was actually greater for the military workers. For example,
the individual cost for quarter 1 was $4662 and $6383 for
civilian and military, respectively. Although this seems to
contradict the relative costs presented in Table 4-1, the
difference lies in the basis of the costs. The data shown
in Table 4-1 represent base salary or base pay only. Civil-
ian current dollar costs shown in Table 4-2 are the total
labor costs reported by the repair facility on the Radiac
Maintenance Workload Report for that quarter, including
overhead elements. Military current dollar costs shown in
Table 4-3 are the life cycle billet cost amounts, including























Figure 4-1 Output Cost
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These two tables and the figure show cost per unit of
output varying for each facility over the course of time
studied. The average cost per unit of output for the civil-
ians was $37.13 in constant dollars. The average cost per
unit for the military in constant dollars was $103.08. Over-
all, the civilian labor force was more than 2.7 times as
efficient as the military labor force. Not surprisingly,
the comparison between the efficiency of the two labor forces
shown in Figure 4-1 is very similar to that shown in Figure
3-2, except that the disparity between civilian and military
is even greater than in the earlier comparison.
It should be noted that cost comparisons between the
civilian and military workforces should be made with some
caution because of differences in the data. As noted above
in Section A, labor cost for both labor forces included over-
head cost elements, however the two models used in estimating
overhead costs for civilian and for military were dissimilar.
C. COMPARISON OF COMPENSATION
To further the analysis of the operational efficiency of
the repair facilities, an analysis of hours worked was made.
The cost data resulting from this analysis will subsequently
be matched with cost per unit of output.
"Hours worked" (HW) are those hours actually spent at
work. "Hours paid: (HP) are those hours at work plus train-
ing, leave, holidays and diversion time. These correspond,
respectively, to the concepts of "productive labor" and
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"available labor" used in the preceeding chapter. A com-
parison was made to analyze the difference in hourly com-
pensation between civilian and military. These data are
shown in Tables 4-4 and 4-5 for the civilian and military
personnel. Table 4-4 shows the actual hours worked as re-
corded for the civilians. Table 4-5 shows, for the military,
annual hours available for work (hours paid); estimated di-
version time, and the resulting estimate of hours worked.
Both tables show, for their respective labor forces, annual
compensation and compensation per man-hour for each fiscal
year. The compensation figures are shown both in current
and constant dollars.
These tables indicate that the compensation per man-hour
was significantly greater for the military workforce; approx-
imately fifty per cent greater. Of course, the same cautions
that applied to the civilian-to-military comparisons of pro-
ductivity in Chapter III and to the comparisons of labor cost
per unit of output discussed earlier in this chapter also
apply here, as this comparison is based on the same data and
thus has the same imperfections.
D. COST AND PRODUCTIVITY
When the output per man-hour data from Chapter III is
matched with the compensation per man-hour above, a compar-
ison of cost and productivity can be made for each facility.
Table 4-6 presents in fiscal year aggregates the average
output per manhour and compensation per manhour in constant






COMPENSATION PER HOUR WORKED (CIVILIAN)
FY 80 FY 81 FY 82

































ANNUAL HOURS WORKED FROM TABLE 3-5 (STANDARDIZED
MAN-HOURS)
ANNUAL COMPENSATION FROM TABLE 4-2
CUR $ (CURRENT DOLLARS)
CON $ (CONSTANT DOLLARS)
LABOR HOURS AND COMPENSATION WERE SUMMED FOR EACH
YEAR
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FY 80 FY 81
HOURS PAID 4160* 4680**
LESS: DIVERSION 838 943
EQUALS: ANNUAL HOURS 3322 3737
TABLE 4-5







COMPENSATION $51064 $61331 $100450
(CUR $)
ANNUAL
COMPENSATION $51064 $54760 $ 77269
(CON $)
COMPENSATION PER
MAN-HOURS $15.37 $16.41 $20.16
(CUR $)
COMPENSATION PER
MAN-HOUR $15.37 $14.65 $15.51
(CON $)
SOURCE: ANNUAL HOURS FROM TABLES 3-2 AND 3-4
ANNUAL COMPENSATION FROM TABLE 4-3
LEGEND: * (2 WORKERS)
** (AVERAGE OF 2.2 5 WORKERS
*** (3 WORKERS)
CUR $ (CURRENT DOLLARS)
CON $ (CONSTANT DOLLARS)
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TABLE 4-6
PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPENSATION PER MAN-HOUR
Civilians Military
FY Productivity Cost/Hour Productivity Cost/Hour
80 .277 $11.08
81 .247 $ 9.53








SOURCE: TABLES 3-5, 3-7, 4-4, AND 4-5
LEGEND: PRODUCTIVITY (STANDARD CALIBRATION UNITS PER HOUR)
COST/HOUR WORKED (COST PER HOUR WORKED IN CONSTANT
DOLLARS
)
CIVILIAN BASED ON STANDARDIZED MAN-HOUR ESTIMATES;
MILITARY BASED ON ADJUSTED MAN-HOUR ESTIMATES.
From fiscal year 1980 to 1981 there was a slight decrease
in productivity for the civilian personnel. The comparison
between FY80 and FY82 shows a 23% increase in productivity
in FY82 over FY80 and an 11% decrease in compensation (con-
stant dollar). The military output gradually dropped over
the period covered by the study. Between the fiscal years
1980 and 1982 productivity decreased 29% while compensation
rose slightly. The decrease in productivity apparently was
the result of the third technician being added in the eighth
quarter. There was not a corresponding increase in workload
associated with the additional manning, therefore productiv-
ity was reduced.
When the data for civilian and military are compared to
each other the only similarity is the FY81 decrease in pro-
ductivity. In neither case did the collected data give any
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explanation for the reduced level of productivity in FY 81.
Looking at the period of time covered by this study, the
military-manned facility overall showed low productivity.
The cost associated with the military level of output seems
quite high, but one must remember that labor cost was based
on the life cycle cost concept. According to the data anal-
ysis the civilian operation had nearly twice the level of
productivity that the military-manned facility had. At the
same time, the military labor cost was fifty per cent greater
than that of the civilian facility. As a result, the per
unit cost for calibrating a radiac in Rota was nearly three
times greater than it was in Washington.
E . SUMMARY
This chapter has reviewed and analyzed labor cost for
both labor forces in terms of current and constant dollars.
The analysis showned that the military had a greater per
person labor cost.
Next, labor cost was compared with productivity levels
to determine the actual cost of output per unit. The calcu-
lated cost showed that the average cost per unit for the
civilians in constant dollars was $35.63 and $99.44 for the
military. This analysis showed the civilian operation to be
more efficient than the military.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Throughout the course of the study, factors were dis-
cussed which contributed to the overall calculated cost and
level of productivity achieved at Navy Radiac Repair Facil-
ities (RRFs). Foremost among these factors was whether the
calibration work was performed by civilian or military tech-
nicians. In order to study the hypothesis that the labor
force did affect productivity, data were collected for two
forces: civilian at RRF Washington and military at RRF Rota.
At the beginning of the study, there was no reason to
believe that either repair facility labor force would be
significantly better than the other. However, as the study
developed, it became more apparent that staffing did have a
bearing on the efficiency of the operation of the repair fa-
cilities. In Chapter III, it was shown that the facility
manned by civilians had nearly twice the productivity in
units calibrated per man-hour as did the facility manned by
military.
The difference in observed productivity may have been
due in part to workforce differences. Specifically, that it
may have been due to differences in skill and familiarity
with the equipment and to differences in assigned tasks.
The civilians had more specific work experience repairing
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radiacs than the military personnel. This experience is due
in part to the relative stability of the civilian workforce
as compared to the frequent duty rotation of the military.
As a general rule, the civilians were not assigned tasks
other than the ones for which they were hired. It was quite
possible that the military personnel was assigned to watch-
standing, shore patrol, mess cooking, and other duties all
of which could take a considerable amount of what was pre-
sumed to be "productive" time.
It was also theorized that the difference in productivity
may have, in part, been due to possible differences in work-
loading. Although data on workloading was not present in
sufficient detail to explore this hypothesis, it did seem
plausible based on the nature of the repair facilities' cus-
tomers. RRF Washington serviced shore-based activities
which did not have fluctuations in their operating schedules.
RRF Rota's major customers were operating ships and aircraft
squadrons which frequently had changes in operating schedules,
The Washington facility could schedule the arrival of equip-
ment whereas the Rota facility received the majority of its
work when the ships and aircrafts were in port.
The analysis continued, in Chapter IV, with an examina-
tion of the labor cost per unit output for the two facili-
ties. Labor cost was found significantly higher for the
military. The overall cost per unit of output (in constant
1980 dollars) was $35.63 and $99.44, for the civilian and
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military facilities, respectively. This was consistent with
the findings in Chapter III which had shown a much lower
level of productivity for the military.
The analyses in Chapter III and IV indicated that the
civilian-manned repair facility was far more efficient than
was the military-manned facility.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
As this analysis developed, it became apparent that data
on workloading could serve as a vital link. Without accu-
rate and detailed workloading data the results of the anal-
ysis may be misleading.
A detailed accounting of weekly throughput based on type
of equipment would benefit future studies since all equip-
ments do not require the same amount of time for calibrations.
It is assumed that the less complex equipments would require
less time. Having access to this information would show
whether one or both facilities had equipments which took a
long time to calibrate, a short period of time to calibrate,
or an even mixture. It would also be helpful to determine
if benchmark calibration times exist for the various types
of radiacs and determine if actual calibration times are
recorded on equipment maintenance records.
At the same time a determination should be made as to
whether the repair facilities are practicing stockpiling.
Stockpiled equipments could be identified by checking the
arrival and departure dates on the maintenance records.
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Review of the maintenance records and Radiac Maintenance
Workload Reports would show peaks and valleys which could be
indicative of overloading during some periods and not others,
Collecting this additional information would allow a
more complete analysis and a better explanation for the
levels of productivity achieved by each workforce.
Reported data should be audited for accuracy. It is
recommended that civilian man-year data be audited against a
random sampling of time and attendance records. This would
show if the time being reported actually equaled the time
worked.
Actual reporting of military labor input data would aid
future researchers as well as NAVELEX to see the true level
of input commensurate with the level of output. Current
method of estimating labor input for military is much too
subjective and leaves room for error. Having this informa-
tion would also help to determine the cost of doing business
at RRF Rota.
The findings in Chapter III showed the civilians to be
nearly twice as productive as the military. There was no
one apparent reason for this outcome because each workforce
was made up of highly skilled technicians. Because the
reason was not obvious additional work should be done to see
what affects the "learning curve" phenomenon had on the two
workforces. From the results obtained it would seem that
the "learning curve" had more direct effect on the military
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personnel. This is thought to be the case since it was de-
termined earlier in the study that the cvilians had an aver-
age of fifteen years in the Radiac Program. It is recommended
that a literature search be made for studies done with similar
types of work.
This study alone is not enough to recommend that all
RRFs be manned with civilian personnel. The results do war-
rant a thorough study be made of the cost-efficiency of em-
ploying civilian personnel at the two repair facilities which
have military personnel.
It is also recommended that consideration be given to
improving this study. Perhaps this could be done by using
the life cycle cost for the civilian billets as well. This
would make the cost data more comparable because similar




LOCATION OF RADIAC COORDINATORS, AND


































North of Boston; NPTU
W. Milton, NY; NPTU
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First Naval District
In and South of Boston,
Third Naval District
(Connecticut Only)
U.S. Naval Forces Europe




ton, Caribbean Area, and
Guantanamo Bay Area
Eleventh Naval District
Long Beach Naval Ship-
yard






Taiwan, US Forces Mari-
anas, US Forces Philip-
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(SOURCE: NAVELEX INSTRUCTION 9673. 5D)
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APPENDIX B
RADIAC MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD REPORT
NAVELEXINST 9673. 6C
HAVELEX 9673/4 (Rev 6-81)
This report contains; ( ) estimated costs, ( ) actual coats (check one). 3rd QTR FT 80
I. PERSONNEL EMPLOYED AND COST PER PERSON:
a. MANAGERS (GRADED)
TITLE/ FUNCTION* GRADE NAME OF ACTIVITY MAN YEARS
(IN 100th)
**LABOR OVERHEAD SUBTOTAL
($ IN DOLLARS) *
Rad Coord (A) GS-ll NAVSEEACTPAC .25 4,798 2,584 7.382
SUBTOTAL
b. REPAIR AND CALIBRATION PERSONNEL (GRADED AND UNGRADED57





Elect. Mech. (A) PHNSY 2.40 N 63,158 45,360 108,518
Elect. Mech. (B) PHNSY 0.20 \/5,263 3,780 9,043
Elect. Mech. (C) PHNSY 0.40 10,526 7,560 18,086
SUBTOTAL 3.0CL 78,947 56,700 135.647
(COSTS CHARGED TO FUNCTION*A, B AN!
BY EITHER A. B OR C - FUNCTION A COS
SHOULD BE SEPARATED AND NOTED
TO BE INCLUDED IN PARAGRAPH 4)
2. TAD AND TRAINING
LIST TAD TRAINING WITH DOLLARS ALLOCATED JtVsEACH
FUNCTION* (EXPLAIN BRIEFLY HOW IT BENEFITED^rHE
RADIAC PROGRAM BY FUNCTION*.) -.>
A.
A.
NRC' Refresher Training $\>W5





T, TOTAL COST CHARGED TO NAVELEX R QUARTER
SUBTOTAL 1 (MINUS RADIAC COORDINATOR) +2A+3A+








a. MAINTENANCE WORK BY FUNCTION*
MOMENCLATURE RADIAC EQUIPMENT QUANTITY QUANTITY CALIBRATION
OU NON-OU UNITS
(ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS TO ACCOMMODATE LOCAL (SEE NOTE 1) (SEE NOTE 2) (SEE NOTES 3-9)
WORKLOAD. SEE ENCLOSURE (1) TO THIS FORM.) A. 2250 A. 442 A. 770
B. 24 B. B. 24









OPERATIONAL USE PRIORITIES 1-9 LISTED IN NAVELEXINST 9673. 5 ( )
NON OPERATIONAL USE PRIORITIES 10-13 LISTED IN NAVELEXINST 9673. 5( )
RATEMETER PLUS DETECTOR EQUAL ONE CALIBRATION UNIT
5 DOSIMETER CHARGERS EQUAL ONE CALIBRATION UNIT
50 Q.F. DOSIMETERS EQUAL ONE CALIBRATION UNIT
5 DETECTORS (DT-O04) EQUAL ONE CALIBRATION UNIT
1 TLD READER EQUALS THREE CALIBRATION UNITS
8. 25 TLD' s EQUAL ONE CALIBRATION UNIT
> 9. OTHER EQUIPMENTS EQUAL ONE CALIBRATION UNIT EACH
**IF LABOR AND OVERHEAD ARE NOT SEPARATED IN EXPENDITURE REPORT, INDICATE COMBINED FICURE
IN SUB-TOTAL COLUMN.
c Q Enclosure (2)bo

















































QTR MY L&O MY L&O TAD &
TRNG
MATERIAL CAL UNITS
1 .24 $6.7 .74 $18.6 $1.2 400
2 .24 $6.7 .75 $16.0 $1.8 437
3 .24 $6.7 .74 $16.9 $1.5 $1.2 428.5
4 .23 $6.3 .62 $14.0 $ .7 $4.5 376
5 .20 $5.8 .98 $21.6 $3.5 283.5
6 .24 $6.8 .96 $20.5 $1.3 504
7 .23 $6.8 .68 $15.0 $6.2 501
8 .24 $6.5 .67 $14.1 $3.3 400
9 .24 $6.3 .63 $13.0 $ .3 364
10 .12 $3.6 .63 $16.0 $1.0 $2.3 387
11 .14 $4.4 .69 $17.0 $1.7 $1.0 592



















































SOURCE: RADIAC MAINTENANCE WORKLOAD REPORTS
LEGEND: MY (MAN-YEAR)
L&O (LABOR AND OVERHEAD)
TAD & TRNG (TEMPORARY ADDITIONAL DUTY AND TRAINING)
CAL UNITS (CALIBRATION UNITS)
DOLLARS EXPRESSED IN THOUSANDS
60
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